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A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL AND DEFINITIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION IN THE ROME 
STATUTE
David Scheffer*
In an effort to bridge competing visions of how to incorporate the 
crime aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
the author proposes two options for negotiators to consider in the event 
there is no Security Council determination of aggression or referral of ag-
gression to the Prosecutor. The first option would require the Security 
Council, acting under U.N. Charter Chapter VII, to adopt a resolution con-
cluding that a breach of the peace resulting from the use of armed force 
between States has occurred, which then triggers, unless the Council ex-
cludes the possibility, an option for the International Court of Justice or the 
International Criminal Court (whichever court(s) is (are) selected in the 
final draft) to decide that an act of aggression constituting an unlawful mili-
tary intervention has occurred. The second option would require that the 
Security Council act under Chapter VII to refer a breach of the peace re-
sulting from the use of armed force between States to the Prosecutor and 
then either the General Assembly adopts a resolution or the International 
Court of Justice decides or issues an advisory opinion to the effect that an 
act of aggression constituting an unlawful military intervention has oc-
curred.
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to achieve a compromise in the examination by the Spe-
cial Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA)1 concerning the 
jurisdictional and definitional requirements for activating the crime of ag-
 *  David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director 
of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law in 
Chicago, Illinois. He was U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues from 1997 to 
2001. He wishes to thank Ms. Kristen Knapp, a student at Northwestern University School of 
Law, for her expert assistance with this article. 
1 See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCA-2%20English.pdf. 
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gression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),2 I 
advance a proposal that offers two options. Options I (judicial green light) 
and II (soft green light), set forth below, enable negotiators and govern-
ments to consider a range of opportunities by which to argue the merits of 
sustaining some form of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council engage-
ment in the jurisdictional filter and yet to do so within a singular approach 
to the personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction requirements of 
the crime of aggression. In accordance with the framework of the May 2008 
Chairman’s Proposal of the SWGCA,3 I have structured my proposal so that 
the definition of the crime of aggression is found in new Article 8bis and the 
jurisdictional filter is found in new Article 15bis.  
The following discussion recognizes the utility of, and broad sup-
port that might be obtained, from recognition of the opportunity afforded by 
Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute. Under this amendment provision, any 
State Party (and, I would argue as a matter of logic, any non-party State 
unless covered by a Security Council Chapter VII referral resolution pur-
suant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute) can essentially opt-in to any 
amendment on the crime of aggression. The use of the opt-in right may con-
stitute the ultimate compromise between the Permanent Five (United States, 
France, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, and Russia) and oth-
er governments before the crime of aggression can be operationalized in the 
Rome Statute. Another lawyer’s proposal, seeks an amendment to Article 
12 of the Rome Statute that may merit serious consideration.4
NEW ARTICLE 8BIS
In my proposal, new Article 8bis is common to both options, but 
differs somewhat from the May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal. I have omitted 
any effort to define an “act of aggression,” as the SWGCA seeks to do in its 
Article 8bis(2) with liberal application of U.N. General Assembley Resolu-
tion 3314 (GA Res. 3314).5 I propose a definition of the crime of aggression 
that avoids reference to an “act of aggression” because the Security Council 
and the International Court of Justice have not in the past, and would not in 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
3 International Criminal Court, Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed 
by the Chairman (revision June 2008), ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (May 14, 2008) [hereinafter 
May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal], available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2AE91 
1B2-15AA-4276-8F23-5D6818907007/146570/ICCASP6SWGCA2English1.pdf. 
4 Robbie Mason, The ICC, the U.N. and Crimes of Aggression, BEPJ, Mar. 1, 2007, 
http://www.bepj.org.uk/icc-un-crimes-of-aggression; see also ICC Statute, supra note 2, at 
sect. 12. 
5 May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal, supra note 3, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 
U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
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the future, consider themselves bound to UNGA Res. 3314 when determin-
ing the existence of an act of aggression. Neither should the ICC when ad-
judicating the crime of aggression against an individual (or an act of aggres-
sion if given the chance under Option 1 below). However, I propose that the 
elements of the crime of aggression (when drafted) should draw (but not 
exclusively) upon the acts listed in Article 3 of UNGA Res. 3314.6 This 
keeps UNGA Res. 3314 “in the game” but in a far more realistic and prac-
tical manner than, in my humble view, as currently drafted by the SWGCA. 
Within my definition of the crime of aggression in new Article 8(1), 
I have narrowed the crime (for purposes of individual criminal responsibili-
ty) to military interventions of a specific character, with caveats that reflect 
the reality of U.N.SC authorizations, the Uniting for Peace option, and the 
Article 51 exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense. 
(Bear in mind that in Article 15bis of my proposal, the Security Council, 
General Assembly, ICC, or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (depend-
ing on what option is used), can override a State’s initial invocation of Ar-
ticle 51 and determine that in fact an act of aggression has occurred despite 
the State’s plea of self-defense, and thus launch the ICC into individual 
criminal accountability.) I have incorporated much of what is in the 
SWGCA draft but also focused on Article 2(4) of the United Nations Char-
6 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 5, art. 3. Article 3 of G.A. Res. 3314 states: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and 
in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion 
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.  
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ter as an alternative to the broader and far more indeterminate (for criminal 
purposes) scope of “the Charter of the United Nations.” 
Furthermore, Article 8 bis (1) of my proposal limits the definition 
of the crime of aggression to those acts that are “of such a character, gravi-
ty, and scale that it constitutes a manifest violation of the prohibition on the 
use of force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter . . . .” This de-
finition conforms to the gravity, duration, and context confirmed by the ICJ 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda judgment (2005).7 Giv-
en the important gravity and contextual requirements associated with geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes under the Rome Statute, 
there is an obvious need to establish some general threshold for the use of 
armed force which would qualify it as the crime of aggression. The lan-
guage I have chosen to express that threshold is open to interpretation, as 
are the other crimes subject to magnitude conditionality under the Rome 
Statute. But it is a calculation that the ICC, once seized with an investiga-
tion into an act of aggression, should be capable of making.  
ARTICLE 15BIS: LANGUAGE COMMON TO BOTH OPTIONS
Both of the options for Article 15bis, Sections 1 and 2, mirror the 
language from the May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal for Article 15bis, Sec-
tions 1 and 2.8 This initial jurisdictional filter would require that “the Secu-
rity Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by 
the State concerned.” This reflects the longstanding proposal of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and other nations which would 
minimize any concerns about contravening the U.N. Charter because the 
Security Council has clear, and some would argue sole, authority to make 
such a determination pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter.9 Once such a 
7 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 1, 
57 (Dec. 19) (“In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly 
concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the 
DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC 
and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a 
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition 
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.).  
8 May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal, supra note 3 at 4. 
9 International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly of State Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional 
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-
ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (July 25, 2007), ¶¶ 25, 30 [hereinafter Special Working Group July 
2007 Meeting]; ICC, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007), ¶ 26; ICC, Assembly of State 
Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 (Nov. 23–Dec. 1, 2006), ¶ 57; ICC, Assembly of 
State Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression, ICC-ASP/4/32 (June 13–June 15, 2005), ¶¶ 66–67; THE INTERNATIONAL 
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determination on aggression is made by the Council, then the ICC Prosecu-
tor could investigate any individual who might be responsible in a criminal 
context for such act of aggression identified by the Council. Most propo-
nents of much broader jurisdictional filters for the crime of aggression still 
embrace the logic of including this procedure of the Security Council’s de-
termination on aggression as one of several ways to trigger ICC jurisdiction, 
and the May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal reflects it.10 Thus, I position it as 
the first of two alternative means to establish ICC jurisdiction. The reality, 
however, is that the Security Council rarely makes such an emphatic deci-
sion on an act of aggression.11 The question governments confront is wheth-
er there should be a continued role for the Security Council in the jurisdic-
tional framework in the absence of an explicit decision by the Council on 
aggression, and whether that role should reflect the reality of how the Coun-
cil actually operates. 
Similarly, the language of Section 3(a) is drawn from Article 15bis 
Alternative 1, Option 2 (green light) of the May 2008 Chairman’s Propos-
al,12 which simply incorporates what already is permitted under Rome Sta-
tute Article 13(b), namely, referrals by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter. 
Option I: Judicial Green Light 
Option I steers the jurisdictional filter away from political determi-
nations of aggression per se and towards a more pragmatic methodology in 
terms of how the U.N. Security Council operates. The substance of Option 
I, which is set forth in its entirety in the annex to this article, is as follows: 
The new Article 15(3)(b) of Option I would require a Security 
Council Chapter VII resolution determining a breach of the peace resulting 
from the use of armed force (and lacking any conditionality prohibiting 
Court interference), which then triggers a judicial option for the ICC or the 
ICJ to determine whether an act of aggression has occurred. This option 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 121–49 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi 
eds., Ashgate Publ’g Ltd., 2004). 
10 See May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal, supra note 3. See also Special Working Group 
July 2007 Meeting, supra note 9, ¶¶ 25, 31 (“While some participants argued that “the Sta-
tute did not require a prior determination by the Security Council” and others supported 
additional trigger mechanisms, such as determinations by the General Assembly or the ICJ 
none of the members of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression proposed 
removing entirely the role of the Security Council as an option in the determination on ag-
gression.).
11 United Nations, Security Council Resolutions, http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm; 
See also Keith E. Puls, Book Review, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 139, 142 (1994) (noting the relative 
absence of explicit decisions by the Security Council). 
12 May 2008 Chairman’s Proposal, supra note 3, art. 15 bis, ¶ 3, Option 2. 
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invites a judicial consideration provided the Security Council has not prohi-
bited it by the terms of the Chapter VII resolution (which could arise, for 
example, if it is simply a follow-on sanctions resolution and the Council 
determines that ICC intervention at that stage would be too disruptive of 
peace and security priorities).  
If the jurisdictional filter requires a continued role for the Security 
Council—an outcome that may be necessary in order to reach a broad con-
sensus on the crime of aggression for the Rome Statute—then new Article 
15(3)(b) of Option I provides that when the Security Council makes a de-
termination about the existence of any breach of the peace—which it is em-
powered to make but which may or may not describe an actual act of ag-
gression—then an international court of law has the opportunity to deter-
mine whether an act of aggression in fact has occurred. I have bracketed 
both judicial options to invite consideration whether the SWGCA wants to 
resort only to the ICC, only to the ICJ, or to either option. 
The proposed language narrows the scope for action to those situa-
tions which are “the result of the use of armed force between States . . . .” I 
have structured the proposal in this vein in order to achieve common ground 
on the character of state-on-state aggression that all governments can agree 
would constitute the context within which an individual should be subject to 
investigation and, if merited, prosecution for the crime of aggression under 
customary international law. The use of armed force is a requirement for the 
definition of aggression as set forth in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of General As-
sembly Resolution 3314 (Dec. 14, 1974)13 and therefore the proposal em-
13 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 4, arts. 1–3 states:  
Article 1: Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Defini-
tion. Explanatory note: In this Definition the term “State”: (a) Is used without pre-
judice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United 
Nations; (b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate.  
Article 2: The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security 
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an 
act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other re-
levant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their conse-
quences are not of sufficient gravity.  
Article 3: Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, sub-
ject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of ag-
gression: (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory 
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of 
another State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State 
against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against 
the territory of another State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by 
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braces the core principles of that key resolution which many governments 
rely on to help frame their own positions regarding the crime of aggression 
of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, this formulation complements the lan-
guage suggested for Article 8bis.  
Absent from this determination by the Security Council would be 
strictly “economic aggression” (such as economic sanctions or punitive 
trade measures), “political aggression” (such as diplomatic sanctions or 
immigration restrictions), or any other alleged “aggression” that occurs 
without the use of armed force. One can always make the argument that the 
Security Council can find such non-military forms of aggression to be 
threats to international peace and security and act accordingly, but that need 
not throw the situation into the lap of the ICC for criminal investigations 
and prosecutions. That extreme measure—at this point in history and in the 
development of customary international law—should be reserved for ag-
gression that arises from the threat or use of armed force. 
I have bracketed two sub-options pursuant to which a judicial body 
would make the determination of state-on-state aggression in the event the 
Security Council does not explicitly do so as described in new Article 
15(3)(b) of Option I. The first sub-option would designate the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC as the judicial body empowered to make a judgment 
about an act of aggression having been committed. Some may find this op-
tion too problematic and risky because the ICC judges’ primary expertise 
likely will be in national or international criminal law and not the interna-
tional law jurisprudence and theory typically associated with judgments 
about state-on-state acts of aggression.  
The latter kind of expertise would be found in the second sub-
option, whereby the ICJ would deliver a judgment on aggression pursuant to 
either: (1) a contentious case between states or (2) a formal request by the 
Security Council or the U.N. General Assembly. Advisory opinions often 
can be delivered within relatively short periods of time compared to judg-
ments in contentious cases,14 and such a procedure might lend itself to the 
the armed forces of another State; (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on 
the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; (e) The use of 
armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in 
the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the ter-
mination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which 
it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for per-
petrating an act of aggression against a third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf 
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts 
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
14 Of the 24 ICJ advisory opinions since 1948, 62.5% (14) were rendered within eight 
months of their respective filings. International Court of Justice, List of Advisory Proceed-
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need to act in a timely manner to deter alleged aggressors from continuing 
with plans or actions relating to aggression.   
Provided the jurisdictional filter can be established as set forth in 
Article 15(3)(b) of Option I, the ICC will need to (and Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Statute requires that the ICC) have a defined crime of aggression for 
which individuals can be investigated and, if merited, prosecuted.  This re-
quirement is fulfilled by Article 8bis described above, specifically Article 
8(1).
Article 8bis establishes a leadership criterion for the commission of 
the crime, namely, “a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action (in whole or in substantial 
part) of a State, of an unlawful military intervention by one State into the 
territory (land, sea, or air) of another State of such character, gravity and 
scale that it constitutes a manifest violation of the prohibition on the use of 
force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter . . . .” This does not 
preclude the further requirement, set forth in new Article 15(3)(b) of Option 
I, that the decision of the Security Council on a use of armed force still re-
quires a further decision on an act of aggression by either the ICC or the ICJ 
(depending on whether one or both bracketed options would be agreed to by 
negotiators and States Parties to the Rome Statute). This definitional provi-
sion ensures that the individual who is or has been in a leadership position 
holds that post in the state that is determined to be the aggressor state. 
The Security Council rarely resorts to “aggression” terminology and 
the examples of the now distant past demonstrate that the Council has used 
the term to describe relatively minor uses of military force while using other 
U.N. Charter terminology (threats to or breaches of international peace and 
security, unlawful use of force, etc.) to describe far more significant uses of 
military force classically regarded as aggression.15 Once the Security Coun-
cil determines that a breach of the peace has occurred, often by condemning 
it, that determination memorialized in a resolution should be sufficient to 
trigger a process that can determine whether an act of state-on-state aggres-
sion per se has occurred, which then would enable the ICC to investigate 
persons for purposes of individual criminal culpability.  
Permanent members of the Security Council concerned that this me-
thodology too easily would open the door to determinations of state-on-state 
aggression, which arguably only the Security Council should make pursuant 
to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, could remain confident that any determi-
ings Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Culmination, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&sort=2&p3=0.
15 See J.A. Frowein & N. Krisch, Article 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002, Oxford University Press) 718–29. See also
Yoram Dinstein, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (4th ed. 2005, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press) 214–15. 
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nation or condemnation regarding a breach of the peace as a result of the 
use of armed force, which is adopted by the Security Council in a resolu-
tion, likely will not condemn any one of them. Of course, such a result un-
derstandably will be of concern to other governments resentful of the pow-
ers and protection that the permanent members enjoy under the U.N. Char-
ter. But the advantage of the proposal is that it realistically would open up 
most (perhaps all if the Permanent Five refrain from aggression) situations 
of aggression in the future to scrutiny by the ICC if the Security Council or, 
depending on which bracketed option is chosen, the ICC or the ICJ reaches 
the preliminary decision that state-on-state aggression has occurred follow-
ing a determination by the Security Council that a breach of the peace has 
occurred.
This kind of determination (breach of the peace) constitutes the rai-
son d’etre of the Security Council and necessarily will remain the bread and 
butter of Council work.  In other words, addressing threats to international 
peace and security is the Council’s primary job and it is unavoidable. My 
proposal accepts that reality and uses it to open a logical door to determina-
tion whether state-on-state aggression has occurred. I would argue that the 
equality of states principle16 remains intact because this process conforms to 
the U.N. Charter. It remains possible that aggression allegedly committed 
by a permanent member of the Security Council could be adjudicated by the 
ICJ if the jurisdictional requirements of that court are met. It would be diffi-
cult to argue that somehow the existing procedures of the ICJ challenge the 
equality of states principle less than would the procedures I have proposed 
with respect to the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
There has been commentary within the Special Working Group 
with respect to this approach, namely that “a Council decision might be 
interpreted as de facto determination of an act of aggression, irrespective of 
the Council’s intention. It might therefore have a negative impact on the 
decision-making within the Council, which might adjust the way it used 
certain terms. It was argued that this option would also create a subordinate 
relationship between the Court and the Council.”17 This merits a response.  
Under Option I as I have drafted it, an act of aggression must still 
be determined to have been committed following the initial Security Coun-
cil determination of “the existence a breach of the peace as a result of the 
use of armed force between States. . . .” Security Council members would 
know that their determination alone does not trigger ICC jurisdiction. Ra-
ther, a subsequent decision by an international court, either the ICC or the 
16 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 106–07, 
350, 428 (West Group, 4th ed. 2001); EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard University Press, 1920); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, 
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
17 Special Working Group July 2007 Meeting, supra note 9, ¶ 30. 
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ICJ (depending on which bracketed option is chosen), would be required. 
One might argue that such a prospect alone would cause havoc within 
Council deliberations, such that both permanent and non-permanent mem-
bers of the Council would seek to find alternative formulations or decide not 
to decide in order to avoid potential ICC jurisdiction over the crime of ag-
gression. While that concern is understandable, I do not believe it has as 
much currency as might be presumed.   
First, the U.N. Charter does not provide any flexibility to arrive at 
decisions in the Security Council other than with respect to and in the con-
text of issues of international peace and security, however they may be de-
scribed. Option I captures the ambit of Council decision-making. The 
Council would have an easy supplemental choice if it wishes to adopt a res-
olution that forecloses the possibility of ICC jurisdiction in a particular mat-
ter. The Council either i) could use wording that conforms to the require-
ments of Article 16 of the Rome Statute18 or ii) adopt a Chapter VII resolu-
tion that would narrowly focus potential ICC jurisdiction. Alternative (i) 
was used in Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002)19 and 1487 (2003).20
Despite the controversy generated by these resolutions, which ensured that 
the second one would not be renewed in 2004, the Council has demonstrat-
ed its ability to take such a step. Alternative (ii) was used in Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1593 (2005)21 referring the Darfur situation to the ICC and in 
other Chapter VII resolutions pertaining to the international criminal tribun-
als established by the Security Council.22   
There might be some dispute over the extent of the Council’s pow-
ers to establish the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction in a particular situation, 
but in the end the ICC likely would give great deference to any limitations 
that the Council might impose under Chapter VII authority. The alterna-
tive—to require an explicit Security Council determination on aggression 
per se—invites the predicament that the Security Council may never again 
make such a determination. If it does not, the issue arises whether that inde-
cision unleashes non-Security Council options on the crime of aggression 
18 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution may be com-
menced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions.”).  
19 S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002). 
20 S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003). 
21 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
22 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); S.C. 
Res. 1400, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1400 (Mar. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 
(May 20, 2007). 
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for the ICC that have been proposed but also have proven so intractable in 
the Special Working Group negotiations. Option I embraces the obvious 
reality that nostalgic adherence to the term “aggression” creates a gridlock 
that defies the actual practice of the Council and how the modern world 
describes what is occurring in the field, namely as breaches of the peace 
which sometimes—although likely infrequently—would embrace the clas-
sic understanding of “aggression” and yet more often would be defined as 
uses of armed force falling short of “aggression.”  
Second, the Rome Statute already recognizes a de facto “subordi-
nate relationship” between the ICC and the Security Council in Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute and in the limitations that the Council itself might impose 
in a referral under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. It is a very limited and 
practical (de facto) subordinate relationship, but one that was well recog-
nized in the drafting of those provisions. Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute 
also leaves the door open for a limited subordinate relationship when it re-
quires that the crime of aggression “provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” Option I avoids 
what some governments might view as the extreme position of requiring a 
Security Council determination of “aggression” per se, which creates a far 
more radical subordinate relationship to the Council on the crime of aggres-
sion; it also avoids, however, the other extreme position that simply in-
cludes the Council as one of several different means to initiate a determina-
tion that an act of aggression has occurred.  In Option I, the Council at least 
has to be engaged in order to determine that a breach to international peace 
and security is present, following which another designated body may de-
termine that, within the context established by the Council, an act of aggres-
sion between one state and another state has occurred.
The result is the proverbial “you can’t please everybody” compro-
mise. In my opinion, there is far greater risk in challenging the authority of 
the Security Council and triggering dangerous confrontations between the 
Council and the ICC if even the Council’s authority with respect to breaches 
to international peace and security, much less aggression, is ignored by the 
Rome Statute. Fears that the Council will feel constrained by Option I pale 
in comparison to how the Council will react if the ICC moves forward on 
the crime of aggression without any deference to the Council’s overall 
Charter authority with respect to breaches of the peace, which in any prac-
tical sense first would have to be established before determinations regard-
ing acts of aggression could be credibly examined by any other U.N. body. 
If the ICC could act upon a non-Council determination that an act of aggres-
sion has occurred without any initial determination by the Security Council 
that a breach of the peace has occurred, then potentially destructive jurisdic-
tional battles would be fought between the Council and the ICC, probably to 
the detriment of both peace and justice. 
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A further advantage to Option I is that it avoids, at least in signifi-
cant part, the debate that predictably would arise as to whether a particular 
use of armed force constitutes an exception to the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) 
prohibition on “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.” If the Security Council determines that 
a breach of the peace has occurred and has identified the offending state in a 
Chapter VII resolution embodying the determination, then the Council for 
all intents and purposes has denied the legitimacy of any rationale for the 
use of armed force by the offending state in the particular situation (includ-
ing self-defense, humanitarian intervention, protection of nationals, counter-
terrorism, or advancement of democracy). If, however, negotiators turn to 
non-Council formulas to trigger ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion, then any of those rationales for the use of armed force, such as self-
defense, could be employed by governments, defense counsel, scholars, and 
the media to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Security Council can 
preemptively sideline those arguments by using wording and a procedure 
that establish an unlawful use of armed force and, perhaps, an act of aggres-
sion for which there is no justifiable rationale under international law. 
Option II: Soft Green Light 
Option II preserves a significant role for the Security Council but, at 
the discretion of the Council, offers the option of sharing the final determi-
nation of whether aggression has occurred with certain other designated 
U.N. organs or the ICC itself. It recognizes that the Security Council may 
not, indeed probably will not, want to make an immediate determination 
about aggression but may be willing to initiate a process that enables anoth-
er U.N. organ, or the ICC, to make that call. It is “passing the buck” to other 
bodies but in a way that remains within the initial control of the Security 
Council.  
Under New Article 15(3)(b) of Option II, the wording of which is 
set forth in the appendix to this article, I propose a formula that retains more 
control with the Security Council by requiring that the Security Council 
must first refer a breach of the peace situation to the Prosecutor who can 
then launch an investigation in one of two situations. Either the General 
Assembly must have adopted a resolution determining that an act of aggres-
sion has occurred or the ICJ must have delivered a judgment or an advisory 
opinion ruling that an act of aggression has occurred. Under this proposal, 
the Security Council steers the decision-making process into the institution 
of its choosing if the Council has chosen not to make the decision itself.  
My hope is that negotiators will recognize the considerable latitude 
afforded the Security Council in these proposals, such that a far broader 
range of situations which may constitute state-on-state aggression in fact 
can be brought before the ICC for investigation of individual criminal cul-
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pability. This bridge, between those governments which believe in a central 
role for the Security Council and those governments which reject that view, 
is intended to establish a very pragmatic but disciplined process.  I purpose-
ly do not include within any definitional structure acts of strictly internal 
aggression or terrorist or militia acts unconnected to state authority. That is 
a bridge too far for customary international law and for the ICC’s criminal 
jurisdiction at this stage, in my view. I also think moving in that direction 
would break the back of the entire exercise. 
CONCLUSION
I readily concede that the straightforward SWGCA green light ju-
risdictional procedure, coupled with an opt-in procedure for the crime of 
aggression, may be the ideal formula for the Permanent Five and some other 
U.N. members. However, the objective of this article is to present two addi-
tional options that may be necessary to consider to bridge the gap between 
the Permanent Five and a number of other governments, the latter of which 
are seeking some alternative to an exclusive Security Council filter.  
APPENDIX: SCHEFFER PROPOSAL
A. New Article 8bis of the Rome Statute 
Crime of Aggression 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position ef-
fectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
(in whole or substantial part) of a State, of an unlawful military intervention 
by one State into the territory (land, sea, or air) of another State of such cha-
racter, gravity, and scale that it constitutes a manifest violation of the prohi-
bition on the use of force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 
provided that the lawful deployment or use of armed force undertaken pur-
suant to Security Council authorization, United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950, or Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter shall be excluded from such definition. 
2. The elements of the crime of aggression shall draw, inter alia, 
from Articles 2 and 3 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974 to establish the character of an act of aggres-
sion for purposes of criminal responsibility under this Statute. 
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B.  Option 1 (judicial green light) 
New Article 15bis of the Rome Statute 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion in accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article. 
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or 
she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determina-
tion of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecu-
tor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation 
before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 
3. In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not 
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression unless  
a. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the Prosecutor to 
proceed with the investigation in respect of an act of aggression 
committed by the State concerned and any crime of aggression that 
arises thereunder, or  
b. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations and which lacks any condi-
tionality regarding the Court, determined the existence of a breach of 
the peace as the result of the use of armed force between States and 
thereafter, with respect to that situation, [the Pre-Trial Chamber has 
determined at the request of the Prosecutor, a State Party, or the Secu-
rity Council that an act of aggression has been committed by the State 
concerned] [or] [the International Court of Justice has delivered a 
judgment in a contentious case or an advisory opinion, pursuant to the 
request of the General Assembly or the Security Council, which de-
termines that an act of aggression has been committed by the State 
concerned]. 
4. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the 
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5. 
C.  Option II (soft green light) 
Article 15bis 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion in accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article. 
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or 
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she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determina-
tion of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecu-
tor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation 
before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 
3. In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not 
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression unless  
a. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the Prosecutor to 
proceed with the investigation in respect of an act of aggression 
committed by the State concerned and any crime of aggression that 
arises thereunder, or  
b. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, referred to the Prosecutor a 
situation regarding the existence of a breach of the peace as a result of 
the use of armed force between States but about which the Security 
Council has not determined that an act of aggression has occurred, 
and provided thereafter that the General Assembly has determined by 
resolution or the International Court of Justice has delivered a judg-
ment in a contentious case or an advisory opinion, pursuant to the re-
quest of the General Assembly or the Security Council, determining 
that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned 
in respect of such situation. 
4. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the 
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5. 
D.  For both option I and option II: 
New Article 25 (3bis): 
In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article 
shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action (in whole or substantial part) of a 
State.
